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DAMAGES AS AFFECTED BY FLUCTUATIONS
IN VALUE*
CHARLES

T. McCoRlmicc**

Fluctuations in Market Value1
We should not get an exaggerated notion of the accuracy with
which a recovery of market value places one who has been deprived
of property in the situation he would be in if he had not been wronged.
If a railroad engine has set sparks to a farmer's hay-rick and destroyed the hay, the value of the hay when destroyed may afterwards seem too much or too little to measure the financial benefit he
would have had from the hay itself-an attempt which is little better
than guess-work at best. Too much, for it may appear with-certainty
that even if it had not been burned, the farmer would have left the
hay in the field where it would have been destroyed anyway by a
flood which came a few days after the fire. Or again, it may certainly appear that the farmer would have stored the hay in his barn
until the next spring and that then hay was worth only one-half the
market value at the time of the fire. Too little, for it may be clear
that the farmer would have held the hay if it had not burned, and
would have sold it during a year of scarcity when hay became worth
twice the former value. It is reasonably well established that as
against the wrongdoer, the law is willing to disregard the possibility
that an award of market value at the time of the wrong may be too
much. Such an award is the normal measure of damages, both in
contract and tort cases, and will be allowed despite the fact that the
property would have later been damaged or destroyed from other
causes, 2 or the fact that it would have depreciated in market value
* This article will form part of the chapter on "Value," in an Elementary
text-book on Damages, to be published by the West Publishing Co., St. Paul,
Minn.
** Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
1 For discussions of the doctrine of highest intermediate value, see 2 SanGwicK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) ch. XXII; McCormick, Highest ittermediate
Value and Damages for Last Chances (1924) 3 TEx. L. REv. 44. The cases are
collected in Decennial Digests, titles "Trover and Conversion," §49, and "Brokers," §38 (7), and in the following notes: 18 Ann. C. 609; L. R. A. 1917 C.
747; 31 A. L. R. 1179; 40 A. L. R 1282; 63 A. L. R. 305.
'This view finds acceptance in 1 SEDGWiCK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) §243.
The only case cited, however, is contra: St. Louis R. Co. v. Yarbrough, 56 Ark.
612, 619, 20 S. W. 515.
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in the owner's hands.3 Rough justice, but a convenient and reasonable standard, which the courts are not inclined to refine and complicate at the wrongdoer's instance.
The difficulties with the rough and simple standard of values as
of the time of the wrong, arise in the other situation when the person
wronged complains that this recovery is inadequate because of a later
rise in market value of the kind of property of which he has been
wrongfully deprived. One group of courts still stands steadfast and
says that in actions for conversion and for breach of contract of sale,
the rule not only is that one may recover the value of the property at
the time it was converted, or at the time it should have been delivered
under contract, but that the fact that the property is of fluctuating
character, and has later risen in value gives no right to recover any
later, higher value.4 In this group we may place the English courts5
and the courts of the following states:
'McIntyre v. Whitney, 139 App. Div. 557, 124 N. Y. S. 234, affirmed without
opinion, 20, N. Y. 526, 94 N. E. 1096 (1911).
"These courts would, it is true, in claims in the nature of detinue or for
restitution in chancery sometimes allow recovery of the value as of the time
of trial. See Elliott v. 'Hughes (England) post, n. 5, or if the wrongdoer has
sold the converted property for a high price he may be held accountable for the
price he has received, (See Ingram v. Rankin (Wisconsin) post, n. 22), but not
the highest intermediate value.
'Elliott v. Hughes (1863) 176 Eng. Rep. 173 (Breach of contract for
sale and delivery of hops-head-note states damages awarded "were highest
price attained up to date of trial"; Value of goods had continuously risen to date
of trial; judgment shows market price on day of trial was measure of damages
and circumstance that such price was highest was not material-goods paid
for at time of purchase: See the discussion of the English decisions in Ames
v. Sutherland, 9 Ont. L. Rep. 631 (1905), affirmed in 11 Ont. L. Rep. 417 (1906) ;
Little v. London Joint Stock Bank (1891) 1 Ch. 284 (Breach of contract
for delivery of stock-market price at time of failure to deliver) ; Simmons v.
London Joint Stock Bank (1891) 1 Ch. 284 (Conversion of stock-sums received from sale of stock and not highest market price since date of conversion); Samuel & Escombe v. Rowe (1892) 8 T. L. R. 488 (Breach of contract to purchase and sell stock-no general rule stated, but damages allowed
were difference between contract price and price of securities at such time
after breach as court considered reasonable for making new contract) ; Mansell
v. British Linen Co. Bank (1892) 3 Ch. 163 (Injunction obtained vs. defendant shareholder and mortgagees restraining sale of shares claimed by plaintiffdifference between price when injunction was granted and price when summons asking for sale was issued,-or value at time of conversion apparently) ;
Ellis v. Pond (1898) 1 Q. B. 426 (Breach of contract by broker to carry
stock to certain settling day-action one for indemnity by broker, defendant
counterclaims for damages-value of stock at settling day or day of breach
was deducted from amount advanced by plaintiff for purchasing the stocks, instead of value of stock on day sold by plaintiff broker or the amount received
by plaintiff from sale, which would seem to fix measure of damages at market
value on day of breach) ; Michael v. Hart & Co. (1902) 1 K. B. 482 (Breach
of contract for non-delivery of shares-difference between contract price and
market price at date of breach).
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Colorado
Idaho
Massachusetts

Mississippi
Missouri
Nevada

New Hampshire
Ohio
Wisconsin

Other courts, constituting the great majority in this country, have
been more sympathetic in several situations; the traditional measure
of recovery on a basis of value at the time of the wrong has impressed
them as harshly insufficient. A stock, grain or cotton broker agrees
to "carry" for the customer a certain amount of the stock or commodity. The chief purpose of the transaction is to secure for the customer the benefit of any rise in value. The broker wrongfully sells or
converts the property at a time when it is unprofitable for the customer
to sell. After this wrong such property rises sharply in value, and if
the broker had maintained the account the customer would have had
an opportunity to sell at substantial profit. To limit the customer in
an action against the broker to the value at the time of the wrong is
to deny damages altogether for the frustration of the speculation.
Moreover, it enables brokers to disregard instructions of customers
almost with impunity, so long as they sell at the market and hold the
proceeds for the customer or apply them against his indebtedness to
the broker. Similar considerations arise in cases of conversion of the
customer's property by a warehouseman. Even stronger is the appeal
of the owner where some stranger has wantonly converted or destroyed his property at a time when it was worth little, only to have
such property go up rapidly in value after he has lost it. This is less
common, for the kinds of physical property which actually run much
risk to-day of conversion or destruction by strangers (such as household goods or used automobiles) are not usually of standardized price
or highly fluctuating value. Closely approaching the conversion cases,
are those of breach of contract by a seller to deliver the property sold,
of fluctuating value. 6 When the time comes for delivery under the contract, the value is low, but the seller anticipates a rise shortly and refuses to deliver. The buyer, perhaps, has paid the seller the price and
has no funds with which to purchase similar property elsewhere. 7
The anticipated rise comes promptly and the seller reaps the opportunity to profit which the buyer should have had. If the property
'The type-cases are contracts to sell specified quantities of stocks, cotton,

grain, etc.

In cases of ascertained, identified property, title ordinarily passes

of course when the contract is agreed on, and the seller's refusal to deliver is
a conversion, so that the buyer need not sue on the contract but can resort to a
tort action.
'See post, n. 16.
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at the time for delivery was worth no more than the contract-price, the
buyer can recover only his money paid with interest, with no damages for loss of the speculation, under the traditional rule which limits
such damages to the difference between contract price and market
value on the day of delivery.
The difficulty is to depart far enough from the traditional standard
of market value on the day of the wrong, so as to compensate for
these deliberate frustrations of anticipated opportunities to profit,
without losing our moorings altogether. Short of leaving it to a
jury's guess, how can you compensate for a man's loss of opportunities, differing with market fluctuations from day to day, to sell
1000 bushels of wheat, after it has been wrongfully withheld by a
seller, or converted? An early answer, given first by the New York
courts, was extreme both in its simplicity and its possibilities of
harshness upon the wrongdoer. It accomplished perfectly the desired purpose of compensating the claimant for the loss of his opportunity to profit by the rise in the market. It was this*: to allow
as damages the highest value which such property reached on the
market during the period from the time of the wrong down to the
date of the trial of the action. This is the rule of "highest intermediate
value." It obtains, in varying degrees, in these jurisdictions :8
Alabama
Iowa
Pennsylvania
California (statute)
Kentucky
South Carolina
Montana (statute)
S. Dakota (stat.)
Georgia (statute)
Idaho
N. Dakota (stat.)
Texas
Indiana
Oklahoma (stat.)
Washington
Under this rule, as originally announced, the plaintiff has the cards
stacked in his favor. The longer the trial is delayed, the longer the
period in which the plaintiff may speculate for a rise in market. He
runs no corresponding risk, for no matter how low swings the pendulum of prices, the plaintiff gets the peak-price. As an estimate of
probabilities this would be absurd: it is in the highest degree improbable that the plaintiff with uncanny prescience would have waited
until the market had reached its summit and would have sold at that
moment. The vistas of injustice which the rule opened up forced
the courts which adopted it to qualify. Some of them hedged by requiring that the plaintiff's action, must be prosecuted with reasonable diligence.9 A few have modified the rule so as to give the high8

9

The cases are collected in note 22, post.

California, Iowa, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota
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est value only down to the commencement of the action, not the time
of trial.10 Others have said that the rule applies only where defendant's wrong was wanton and deliberate or constituted a fraud or
breach of trust. 1 Three states allow the jury to mitigate the severity
of the rule by placing the amount of damages in the jury's discretion
within its limits.' 2 Several stipulate that in actions for breach of
sale-contracts the plaintiff can get the benefit of the rule only if he
had paid the price before the breach. 13
New York, as the great commercial center, has furnished the experimental laboratory where the original plan to improve upon the
traditional standard, by compensating the person wronged for lost
opportunities to profit on a rising market, was devised. The leading
New York case was decided in 1863.14 The New York courts continued to subject their new rule of highest value to the test of trial and
error, and ten years later, in 1873, the decision in Baker v. Drake'5
announced an improvement upon the improved rule itself. Not content with the rather halting and ill-devised qualifications with which
other courts have sought to stem the sweeping possibilities of the
highest value rule, the New York court drastically modified the
time-period within which the highest price-peak was to be taken.
The doctrine which was used to furnish the mechanism for this
modification, is the doctrine that damages cannot be recovered for
injury which the plaintiff might by reasonable activity on his own
part have avoided. It was suggested that when the plaintiff learns
that his stock or grain is being withheld or has been converted by
the defendant, he should replace himself on the market by purchasing
a like quantity of the commodity with reasonable promptness. If
he really does this, probably it would be in accordance with traditional
practice to allow him to recover the cost of so replacing himself.' 6
Kentucky and Iowa.
Pennsylvania and, probably, Texas.
"Alabama, South Carolina, and Wyoming. Compare also Hogg v. Benito
Farmers' Elevator Co., 2 Com. L. R. 778 (Man. C. A. 1923) a grain conversion
case where the court appears to approve a pronouncement in Greening v. Wilkinson, 1 C. & P. 625 (1825) permitting the jury in its discretion to award as
damages in trover the value at the time of conversion or at any subsequent time.
California, Indiana (except as to shares of stock), Montana, North Dakota.
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas.
1
Romaine v. Van Allen, 26 N. Y. 309. See 2 SEDGwIcx, DAMAGES (9th ed.
1912) §509.
53 N. Y. 211, 13 Am. Rep. 507.
"Hamilton v. Schumacher, 15 S. W. 715 (Tex. Ct. App., 1891); New
England Box Co. v. Tibbetts, 94 Vt. 285, 110 Atl. 434 (1920) ; Covington v.
Ferguson, 204 Ala. 192, 85 So. 726 (1920) ; Kansas Flour Mills Co. v. Brandt,
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Actually, he seldom does, as he usually is financially hard hit, or feels
reluctant to embark more money in a speculation where he is already
involved in disappointment and controversy. But the New York
court ingeniously seized upon this idea of replacement as the basis
for the long-needed time-limit upon the one-sided speculation which
was granted to the plaintiff by the older highest-value doctrine. Thus
emerges the new standard: the plaintiff may recover the highest
value which the commodity reaches from the time when the plaintiff
first learns of the conversion or repudiation, until the end of the
period within which the plaintiff might, acting with reasonable
promptness, have replaced himself on the market. This may conveniently be labeled the rule of highest replacement value. Notice
that the new rule assumes that the plaintiff would have replaced himself at the peak-price of this limited period. More in accordance
with probabilities would be the taking of the average price for the
period.' 7 Of course, the highest price for the limited period is really
adopted as a compromise attempt to value the chance that the plaintiff
might at some time have profited by a rise in value. Observe that,
under the new rule, a period that might reach for several years, depending on such irrelevant circumstances as the state of congestion
of the trial court's docket, or on whether continuances or new trials
have been granted, has been cut down to a few weeks or at most a
couple of months.' 8 The old period is clipped at both ends. The
time for ascertainment of highest value no longer begins at the time
of the'defendant's wrong, but at the time the plaintiff learns of it,
for it is certain that he did not want to take advantage of any rise
that occurred before, as he made no attempt to do so.' 0 The "reasonable time for replacement" is kept from being extended too far
by the jury, by the view, at least, in New York, that where the physical facts about the situation are undisputed, as they usually are, it
is for the judge to say how long is a "reasonable" time.20 This third
98 Kan. 587, 158 Pac. 1120, L. R. A. 1917A 1000 (1916); 35 Cyc. 640 n. 92.
See11also
Decennial and Current Digests, made "Sales,"
§418 (7).
This common-sense suggestion was title,
in a Louisiana case, see note 22
post.
'

"It has been held under varying circumstances that 30 days or 15 days or

60 days would be such reasonable period." Mayer v. Monzo, 221 N. Y. 442, 117
N. E. 948 (1917), Bauer's Cases on Damages, 593.

"In re Salmon Weed & Co. Inc. 53 F. (2d.) 335, syl. 10 (C. C. A. N. Y.
1931).
o Burhorn v. Lockwood, 71 App. Div. 301, 75 N. Y. S. 828, affirmed in 177
N. Y. 539, 69 N. E. 1121 (1903) ; and cases cited L. R. A. 1917C, 757, n. 26;
see also Gervis. v. Kay, 294 Pa. 518, 144 Atl. 529, 63 L. R. A. 297, 304 (1928);
Miller & Co. v. Lyons 113 Va. 275, 74 S. E. 194 (1912).
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rule, of highest replacement value, seems the most equitable and practical of the three. It appears to be growing in favor, and would
doubtless have been still more widely adopted but for the fact that the
old rule of highest intermediate value was crystallized by early code
provisions in California which have been widely copied. It has been
approved in the Supreme Court of the United States, 2 1 and seems
to find sanction to a greater or less degree in the following states:
Arizona
Arkansas
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa (contract cases,
sale price not paid)

Michigan
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania (stock
cases, no deliberate wrong)

Tennessee
Utah
Virginia

A collection of representative cases, arranged by states, illustrat22
ing the holdings under the three rules, is appended in the note.
21 Galigher v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193, 200, 9 S. Ct. 335, 32 L. ed. 658, 661 (1888)
(conversion of stock by broker). Is this a matter of "general" law as to which
local state decisions will not be followed in Federal courts? The local decisions were held to govern as to highest intermediate value, in an action for
cutting timber, on the ground that this was incidental to a dispute over landtitle-a local matter-in Mullins Lumber Co. v. Williamson, etc. Lumber Co.
167 C. C. A. 21, 255 Fed. 645 (S. C., 1918). In cases arising from contracts
relating to stocks or grain, it would seem more likely to be held to be matter
of "general" or commercial law. Compare Bu-Vi-Bar Petroleum Corp. v.
Krow, 40 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. Okla. 1930) and see Decennial and Current
*Digests,title "Courts" §§265 and 272.
The following note is based upon a report made by Miss Naomi Alexander,
Research Assistant in the University of North Carolina, to whom I acknowledge
deep indebtedness for her careful collection and discriminating analysis of the
-cases :
Alabama: Jones v. White, 189 Ala. 622, 66 So. 605 (1914) (value at time
of conversion, but if evidence shows fluctuation, jury may award highest value,
in their discretion); St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ga. F. & A. Ry. Co., 213 Ala.
108, 104 So. 33 (1925) (conversion of coal, highest intermediate value rule) ;
Dominey v. Johnson Brown Co., 123 So. 52 (Ala. 1929) (breach of contract to
,deliver 2 carloads of peanuts-difference between price and value at time of

conversion, purchase price not paid in advance).
Arizona: McFadden v. Shanley, 16 Ariz. 91, 141 Pac. 732 (1914) (breach
of contract of sale of beef cattle-damages difference between contract price
and market value within reasonable time after breach).
Arkansas: Newberger Cotton Co. v. Stevens, 167 Ark. 257, 267 S. W. 777,
(1925) (conversion of cotton-highest replacement value rule).
California: CAL. Crvm CODE (Deering, 1927) §3336: For conversion of personal property detriment is presumed to be (1) value of property at time of
conversion, with interest from that time, or, where action is prosecuted with
reasonable diligence, highest market value of property at any time between
conversion and verdict without interest, at option of injured party, (2) fair
compensation for time and money properly expended in pursuit of property.
Highest intermediate value rule followed: Woltz v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 55 Cal.
App. 741, 204 Pac. 248 (1921) (conversion of oil stock) ; Kimball v. Swenson,
51 Cal. App. 361, 196 Pac. 781 (1921) (conversion of corn); Bell v. Central
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Bank of Imperial Valley, 89 Cal. App. 551, 265 Pac. 551 (1928) (conversion of
cotton crop-highest market value within reasonable time, no reference made
to statute) ; §3308, Detriment caused by breach of seller's agreement to deliver personal property, price of which not fully paid in advance, is deemed
excess if any of value of property to buyer over amount which would'have
been due seller under contract if it had been fulfilled. Las Palmas Winery
& Distillery v. Garrett & Co., 167 Cal. 397, 139 Pac. 1077 (1914) (breach of
contract for sale of 50,000 gal. of Alicante Port wine) ; §3309, Detriment
caused by breach of seller's agreement to deliver personal property, price of
which has been fully paid to him in advance is deemed to be same as in case
of wrongful conversion. (No cases found).
Colorado: Grimes v. Barndollar, 58 Colo. 421, 148 Pac. 256 (1915) (conversion of stock by administrator-value at time of conversion) ; Continental
Divide Mining Inv. Co. v. Bliley, 23 Colo. 160, 46 Pac. 633 (1896) (conversion of stock by partner-value at time of conversion).
Connecticut: Ling v. Malcolm, 77 Conn. 517, 59 Atd. 698 (1905) (breach of
contract for purchase and sale of stocks on margin) ; Wiggin v. Fed. Stock
& Grain Co. 77 Conn. 507, 59 At. 607 (1905) (breach of contract for delivery
of stock). Highest value in reasonable time allowed in both cases.
District of Columbia: Gurley v. MacLennan, 17 App. D. C. 170 (1900)
(breach of contract by broker to purchase stock-value at time of breach);
Tayloe v. Turner, 2 Cranch C. C. 203, Fed. Cases No. 13770 (1820) (action
of debt on bond conditioned to transfer stock-value at time of breach).
Federal: Highest value in reasonable time after breach is rule followed by:
Clements v. Mueller, 41 Fed. (2d) 41, (Dist. Ct., Ariz., 1930) (breach of contract to resell corporate stock) ; In re Swift, 114 Fed. 947 (Dist. Ct., Mass.,
1902) (breach of contract by broker to deliver stocks) ; Isenberg v. Trent Trust
Co., 31 Fed. (2d) 553, (C. C. A. 9th, Hawaii, 1929) (trustee negligently failed
to reduce trust property consisting of stock to possession; trustee claimed liable
only for value within reasonable time for replacement, after cestui's knowledge
of wrong; court overruled this contention and held him liable for amount necessary to restore property to trust).
Florida: Moody v. Caulk, 14 Fla. 50 (1892) (trover for conversion of logsvalue at time of conversion for ordinary merchantable property; dictum:
highest value after conversion if jury is satisfied property would have been
held until advance in value if property is stocks or of fluctuating value).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §4514: In estimating value of personalty unlawfully detained, plaintiff may recover highest amount which he
can prove between time of conversion and trial. Rule followed in Lucas v.
Cornett, 36 Ga. App. 50, 135 S. E. 510 (1926) (conversion of undescribed property) ; Bank of La Grange v. Guinn, 26 Ga. App. 411, 106 S. E. 308 (1921)
(conversion of cotton by pledgee); Farrar Lumber Co. v. Pickering, 22 Ga.
App. 404, 95 S. E. 1001 (1918) (conversion of undescribed property).
Idaho: Averill Machinery Co. v. Vollmer-Clearwater Co., 30 Idaho 587,
166 Pac. 233 (1917) (conversion of crop of grain-value at time of conversion) ;
McCrea v. McGrew, 9 Idaho 382, 75 Pac. 67 (1903) (conversion of wheathighest value rule from time of conversion to time of trial held incorrect, but
no rule laid down).
Illinois: Sturges v. Keith, 57 Ill. 451 (1870) (conversion of stock-value
at time of conversion, no exception for stocks) ; Brewster v. Van Liew, 119 Ill.
554, 8 N. E. 842 (1886) (contract to recover money advanced for purchase of
stock wrongfully sold by defendant broker-decision ambiguous, headnote
recites highest replacement value, but decision does not state whether market
value plaintiff is allowed to recover is highest within reasonable time or at time
of conversion) ; Hughes v. Barrell, 167 Ill. App. 100 (1912) and Schaefer v.
Dickinson, 141 Ill. App. 234 (1908) (conversion of stock-highest replacement
value rule followed on ground it was approved or adopted in Brewster v. Van
Liew, post); Burns v. Shoemaker, 172 Ill. App. 290 (1912) (conversion of
stock by broker-value at time of conversion) ; Farson v. Buder, 187 Ill. App.
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318 (1914) (breach of contract to deliver stock-value at time of breach-no
exception made in case of stocks) ; Bushnell v. Curtis, 236 Ill. App. 89 (1925)
(breach of broker's contract to buy corporate stocks for customer-highest
replacement value).
Indiana: B. L. Blair Co. v. Rose, 26 Ind. App. 487, 60 N. E. 10 (1901) (conversion of stock-highest replacement value) ; Citizens St. R. Co. v. Robbins,
144 Ind. 671, 42 N. E. 916 (1896) (conversion of stock-highest replacement
value) ; Kent v. Ginter, 23 Ind. 1 (1864) (breach of contract for sale and delivery of new corn-highest intermediate value, price paid in advance and action
brought with reasonable diligence).
Iowa: Bryan Co. v- Scurlock, 190 Iowa 534, 180 N. W. 684 (1920) (stock
conversion-allowed highest value during some period of time selected by
plaintiff, although case recites rule in Doyle v. Burns governs, which is highest
replacement value rule; rule followed in case really amounts to highest intermediate value rule) ; Doyle v. Burns, 123 Iowa 488, 99 N. W. 195 (1904)
(conversion of stock-highest replacement value if stock is not paid for;
highest intermediate value between conversion and time of bringing action, if
not unreasonably delayed, if purchase price paid) ; Gilman v. Andrews, 66 Iowa
116, 23 N. W. 291 (1885) (contract to deliver corn-highest intermediate value
between breach and commencement of action, purchase price paid in advance) ;
Cannon v. Folsom, 2 Clarke (Iowa) 101, 63 Am. Dec. 474 (1855) (contract for
sale and delivery of pine logs-general rule of value at time of conversion not
applicable where price paid in advance, but highest intermediate value between
breach and commencement of action, if brought in reagonable time).
Kentucky: Ricketts v. Crittenden, 2 Ky. Opin. 499 (1868) (conversion of
stock-dictum: for wrongful conversion by broker highest intermediate value
from conversion to bringing of action).
Louisiana: Gragard's Succession 106, La. 298, 30 So. 885 (1901) (conversion of cotton-average of prices during reasonable period after conversion); Faraldo v. Ferdinand Gumbel & Co., 128 La. 287, 54 So. 821 (1911)
(contract to hold cotton-value at conversion; true measure is that which will
indemnify party injured); Nat'l. Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Simon Rice Milling
Co., 152 La. 1, 92 So. 713 (1922) (breach of sales contract to deliver 5 carloads
of rice-value at time of breach, unfair to permit plaintiff to select remote date
during rapidly rising market).
Maryland: Andrews v. Clark, 72 Md. 396, 20 Atl. 429 (1890) (conversion of
stock-lays down general rule as value at time of conversion, but allows value
at time stocks were charged as delivered) ; Baltimore City Passenger Railway
Co. v. Sewell, 35 Md. 238 (1872) (breach of contract by corporation by refusal
to issue its stock-value at time of demand and not at any subsequent time).
Massachusetts: Hall v. Paine, 224 Mass. 62, 112 N. E. 153 (1916) (breach
of contract to carry stock and deliver on demand-value at time of
conversion; dictum: special circumstances might be shown which would entitle
customer to prove special damage not exceeding price at which stock could be
bought within reasonable time after accrual of right of action came to knowledge of injured party) ; Koski v. Haskins, 236 Mass. 346, 128 N. E. 427 (1920)
(conversion of 572 bags of onions---"well settled" value at time of conversion
although value fluctuates) ; Maw v. Fay, 248 Mass. 426, 143 N. E. 315 (1924)
(breach of contract to purchase stock on partial payment plan-value at time
of breach).
Michigan: Chadwick v. Butler, 28 Mich. 349 (1873) (contract of sale of crop
of wool-value at time of breach) ; Vos. v. Child, Hulswit & Co., 171 Mich.
595, 137 N. W. 209, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 368 (1912) (breach of contract to deliver stock-highest replacement value); Wallace v. H. W. Noble & Co., 203
Mich. 58, 168 N. W. 984 (1918) (conversion of stock-highest replacement
value); Weaver v. Com'l. Say. Bank, 222 Mich. 337, 192 N. W. 578 (1923)
(conversion of stock-highest replacement value).
Mississippi: Whitfield v. Whitfield, 40 Miss. 352 (1866) (conversion of
slaves and other chattels-value at time of conversion except in cases of fraud
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or malice where measure of damages is determined by jury) ; Bickell v. Colton,
41 Miss. 368 (1867) Assumpsit on contract to deliver cotton, price being paid
in advance-rule in tort action prevails in action for breach of contract and is
based on value at time of breach).
Missouri: Ashbrook v. Mechanics Savings Institution, 5 Mo. App. 597
(1878) (result of unreported case in appendix of volume-breach of contract
to deliver stock-highest market value at any time between sale and commencement of suit) ; Walker v. Borland, 21 Mo. 289 (1855) (trespass for selling horse, cows, and other chattels of plaintiff-value at time of trespass);
Darling v. Potts, 118 Mo. 506, 24 S. W. 461 (1893) (conversion of stock by
trustees-value at time of conversion) ; Fuller v. Presnell, 250 S. W. 374 (Mo.
Sup. 1923).
Montana: MONT. Rav. CODE (Choate, 1921) §8689: Detriment caused by
wrongful conversion of personal property is presumed to be (same as Cal.
statute §3336, supra) ; Klind v. Valley Co. Bank of Hinsdale, 69 Mont. 386,
222 Pac. 439 (1924) (conversion of cattle-conversion rule followed by plaintiff's election) ; Williams v. Gray, Sheriff of Gallatin Co., 62 Mont. 1, 203 Pac.
524 (1922) (conversion of wheat-statute provides plaintiff by waiving interest may elect any date on or between date of conversion and trial on which
to lay his damages); State for Use and Benefit of Broadwater Farms Co.
v. Broadwater Elevator Co., 61 Mont. 215, 201 Pac. 687 (1921) (conversion
of wheat-highest intermediate value) ; §8674, Detriment caused by breach of
agreement to deliver personal property price not paid in advance (same as
Cal. statute §3308, supra) ; §8675, Detriment caused by breach, etc., price fully
paid (same as Cal. statute §3309, supra.)
Nevada: Dixon v. Sou. Pac. Co., 42 Nev. 73, 172 Pac. 368 (affirmed on rehearing 177 Pac. 14) (1918) (conversion of ore-value at time of conversion) ;
Torp v. Clemons, 37 Nev. 474, 142 Pac. 1115 (1914) (conversion of stockvalue at time of conversion).
New York: Wright v. Bank of Metropolis, 110 N. Y. 237, 18 N. E. 79 (1888)
(conversion of stock by pledgee) ; Mullen v. J. J. Quinlan & Co., 195 N. Y.
109, 87 N. E. 1078 (1909) (conversion by broker of shares of stock and quantity
of wheat); In re Dickinson, 171 App. Div. 486, 157 N. Y. Supp. 248 (1916)
(breach of customer's contract by broker by unauthorized sale of stock) ; Mayer
v. Monzo, 221 N. Y. 442, 117 N. E. 948 (1917) (conversion of stock by wrongful
sale of broker); D'Aprile v. Turner-Looker Co., 204 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1924)
(conversion of whiskey) ; Langford v. Fessenden, 208 App. Div. 315, 203 N. Y.
Supp. 301 (1924) (breach of contract to purchase stock on margin).
North Carolina: Arrington v. Wilmington and Weldon R. R. Co., 51 N. C.
68 (1858) (action on case vs. common carrier for wrongful delivery of cotton
-cites with approval Marfield v. Douglas, 1 Sanf. 360 (N. Y.) holding that
a factor is liable in damages for difference between price got by him and highest
price article brought in market before suit was brought, if commenced in reasonable time: Held suit in instant case was brought in reasonable time but as
there was no material difference between value of cotton at time plaintiff received notice of sale and time suit was brought not necessary to decide plaintiff
could recover to time of trial, but held he was entitled to price at time he received
notice of sale which was over month after conversion. No discussion of different rules of damages).
North Dakota: N. D. Comp. LAws ANN. (1913) §7168: Detriment caused
by wrongful conversion of personal property is presumed to be (same as Cal.
statute §3336, supra). The two following cases cite the statute and allow
the highest intermediate value: First State Bank of Kief v. Osborne-McMillan
Elevator Co., 53 N. D. 551, 207 N. W. 37 (1926) (conversion of grain) ; Littler
v. Halla, 46 N. D. 180, 180 N. W. 717 (1920) (conversion of grain). §7153,
Detriment caused by breach of seller's agreement to deliver personal property,
price of which not fully paid in advance (same as Cal. statute §3308, supra);
Talbot v. Boyd, 11 N. D. 81, 88 N. W. 1026 (1902) (agreement to exchange
equal number of bushels of wheat--difference between value of seed wheat
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at time and place it was to be delivered by defendant and market value of plaintiff's wheat at time of refusal of defendant to accept). §7154, Detriment caused
by breach, etc., price fully paid (same as Cal. statute §3309).
New Hampshire: Pinkerton v. Manchester & Lawrence R. R., 42 N. H. 424
(1861) (assumpsit for refusal to deliver certificate of shares of stock-value at
time of demand; dictum-same rule would apply to actions of trespass, trover
or replevin) ; Frothingham v. Morse, 45 N. H. 545 (1864) (action for money
had and received, gold coin pledged as security for becoming bail-measure
of damages restricted to value of gold at time it ought to have been returned).
New Jersey: Dimock v. U. S. Nat'l. Bank, 55 N. J. L. 296,25 Atl. 926 (1893)
(conversion by pledgee of securities pledged for payment of note-no damages
awarded, but dictum to effect that in transactons between broker and customer
dealing in stocks when unauthorized sale is act of conversion proper measure of
damages is highest replacement value).
Ohio: Cincinnati Finance Co. v. Barth, 111 0. S. 261, 145 N. E. 543 (1924)
(conversion of stock by corporation refusing to transfer it on its books-market value of stock at time cause of action accrued).
Oklahoma: OKLA. Comp.

STAT.

ANN. (Bunn, 1921) §5999: Detriment caused

by wrongful conversion of personal property (same as Cal. statute §3336, supra).
The three following cases cite the statute and allow the highest intermediate
value: Funk v. Hendricks, 24 Okla. 837, 105 Pac. 352 (1909) (conversion of
wheat) ; Clark v. Slick Oil Co., 88 Okla. 55, 211 Pac. 496 (1922) (conversion
of oil); U. S. Cities Corp. v. Sautbine, 126 Okla. 172, 259 Pac. 253 (1927.)
(conversion of stock). §5984, Detriment caused by breach of agreement to
deliver personal property price not paid in advance (same as Cal. statute §3308,
supra). §5985, Detriment caused by breach, etc., price fully paid (same as Cal.
statute §3309). Frey v. Failes, 37 Okla. 297, 132 Pac. 342 (1913) (action for
purchase price of carriage sold by defendant to plaintiff-highest intermediate
value between delivery and trial, purchase price paid in advance).
Oregon: Livesley v. Krebs Hop Co., 57 Ore. 352, 107 Pac. 460 (1908)
(breach by purchaser of contract to purchase 100,000 lbs. of hops; seller held
hops and sold them at decreased market price and recovered judgment for
damages; purchaser seeks an accounting based on value of hops at time of
delivery, refused-dictum: if seller had acted wrongfully in holding hops it
would have been liable for highest market price between date of delivery and
time of actual sale).
Pennsylvania: Gervis v. Kay, 294 Pa. 518, 144 Atl. 529 (1928) (conversion
of stock-follows rule of highest replacement value and restricts rule of highest
intermediate value to cases involving deliberate wrong or breach of trust);
Bangor Silk Knitting Co. v. Wise, 277 Pa. 387, 121 AtI. 308 (1923) (conversion by pledgee of collateral consisting of mortgage bonds, stock, and raw
silk-value at time of conversion, rule being different with regard to stocks) ;
The three following cases apply the highest intermediate value rule: In re
Berberich's Estate, 264 Pa. 437, 107 AtI. 813 (1919) (conversion of stock);
Sproul v. Sloan, 241 Pa. 284, 88 Atl. 501 (1913) (conversion of stock) ; Bank of
Montgomery v. Reese, 26 Pa. 143 (1856) (breach of contract for refusing to
allow plaintiff to subscribe to bank stock-purchase price paid in advance).
South Carolina: The three following cases allowed in the discretion of the
jury the highest value of the property converted up to the time of trial: Jordan
v. Hudgens, 146 S. C. 209, 143 S. E. 811 (1928) (conversion of cotton);
Cooper-Smith Co. v. Bell, 137 S. C. 1, 134 S. E. 658 (1926) (conversion of
cotton by pledgee) ; Birt v. Green & Co., 127 S. C. 70, 120 S. E. 747 (1924)
(conversion of cotton).
South Dakota: S. D. Comsp. LAws (1929) §1987: Detriment caused by
wrongful conversion of personal property (same as Cal. statute §3336, supra) ;
Kennel v. Atlas Elev. Co., 34 S. D. 101, 147 N. W. 272 (1914) (conversion of
flax-plaintiff at his option chose value at time of conversion). §§ 1987 and
1972 stating measure of damages for breach of contract (same as Cal. §§3308
and 3309).
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Fluctuationsin the Value of Money

We have considered in the next previous section the question
of how far one who has been wronged by a tort or breach of contract
may recover for the opportunity to benefit by a rise in the market
value of a commodity subsequent to the wrong. Obviously, such a
Tennessee: Hedges v. Burke, 147 Tenn. 247, 247 S. W. 91 (1923) (conversion
of stock, rule of highest replacement value applies) ; Morris v. Wood, 35 S. W.
1013 (Ct. of Ch. App. 1896) (conversion of stock-highest replacement value) ;
Turner v. Jackson, 63 S. W. 511 (Ct. of Ch. App. 1899) (breach of contract to
deliver stocks and bonds in new corporation-highest replacement value).
Texas: San Antonio & A. P. Ry Co. v. Busch, 21 S. W. 164 (Civil Appeals
1893) (breach of contract to issue first mortgage bonds on R. R., consideration paid in advance-highest intermediate value); Johnson v. Miller,
163 S. W. 592 (Civil Appeals, Amarillo 1914) (breach of contract to deliver
chattels-dictum: highest intermediate value); Early-Foster Co. v. Mid-Tex
Oil Mills, 208 S. W. 224 (Civil Appeals, Austin 1919) (conversion of 400 bales
of linters-highest value between conversion and filing of suit, all plaintiff
asked for, conversion being attended by fraud, willful wrong, or gross negligence) ; Thrift Oil & Gas Co. No. 2 v. Newton, 227 S. W. 495 (Civil Appeals, Amarillo 1921) (breach of contract to deliver stock-value at time of
conversion, purchase price not paid in advance; dictum: highest intermediate
value between breach and trial if purchase price paid in advance and suit
brought in reasonable time) ; Burmarsal Co., Inc. v. Lake, 272 S. W. 582 (.Civil
Appeals, El Paso 1925) (innocent conversion of oil well casing-value at
time of conversion; dictum: where trespass is willful, fraudulent, etc., and
property is of fluctuating value, plaintiff may recover highest intermediate
value to date of trial).
Utah: Western Securities Co. v. Silver King Consol. Mining Co. of Utah,
57 Utah 88, 192 Pac. 664 (1920) (conversion of stock; dictum: highest replacement value rule correct).
Virginia: Miller & Co. v. Lyons, 113 Va. 275, 74 S. E. 194 (1912) (breach
of contract to purchase stock on margin-approves highest replacement value
rule and selects as measure of damages the value of stock on a day within a
reasonable time after notice of breach, but does not state that value on that day
was highest during the period for replacement).
Washington: Hetrick v. Smith, 67 Wash. 664, 122 Pac. 363 (1912) (conversion of stock without market value by trustee-value at time of conversion;
dictum: as manner and conditions of the conversion vary, so the measure of
damages vary from nominal to highest value of stock; in general, courts incline to rule of value at time of conversion, or a reasonable time after);
Fish v. Nethercutt, 14 Wash. 582, 45 Pac. 44 (1896) (conversion by sheriff of undescribed personal property-highest intermediate value if taking was wrongful).
Wisconsin: John Ingram v. Edward Rankin, 47 Wis. 406, 2 N. W. 755
(1879) (conversion of quantity of hay, wheat and oats-general rule in action
in contract for non-delivery of goods, or for conversion: (1) value at time
of breach or conversion (2) in conversion if chattels were sold by wrongful
taker plaintiff may recover amount for which sold (3) if still in possession of
defendant may recover value at time of trial at place where and in form when
converted; instruction to jury to apply highest intermediate value rule held
error); Sloan v. Brown County State Bank, 174 Wis. 36, 182 N. W. 363,
(1921) (conversion of stock by pledgee-value at time of conversion, no discussion of any other measure).
Wyoming: Hilliard Flume & Lumber Co. v. Woods, 1 Wyo. 400 (1878)
(conversion 3000 R. R. ties-in jury's discretion highest value between conversion and trial).
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rise in market value may be a rise merely in the value of the particular commodity. Due to an unusual demand, because of a foreign
war, or due to an unusual scarcity caused by a drought, wheat may
rise sharply in value though the price-index of commodities generally
remains stationary. Often, however, the rise in wheat may be coincident with a general upward current of prices of land, stocks, steel,
cotton, and other commodities. In such event, we say that the value
of money, the medium which is used in the exchange of other things,
has fallen. In either event, we have seen that there are legal devices
which enable the person wronged to cast the risk of a rise in the
value of the commodity upon the wrongdoer. If the defendant has
taken the plaintiff's wheat, the plaintiff, if the market goes down,
can insist upon the value at the time of the taking. The fact that
wheat has declined, or that dollars have increased in value, since the
taking, will not lessen the recovery. If wheat goes up, alone or in
company with commodity prices generally, the plaintiff in an action
of the nature of detinue, may recover the value at the time of the
trial, 23 or if the defendant has sold it to a third person at an advance,
may secure judgment for the proceeds, as money had and received
for the plaintiff's use. 24 Moreover, in most of the states, in cases of
tort or of failure to deliver goods under contract, the doctrines of
highest replacement value, or of highest intermediate value, offer opportunity to the plaintiff to recoup for profits which he might have
secured from a rise in value. 25 The former doctrine, which considers
only fluctuations within a relatively short period, will usually not indemnify for a fall in the value of money, which is generally gradual,
but only for the sharp rises in the value of the specific commodity.
The latter, however, which gives the highest value down to the time
of trial, will often serve to protect him against loss from a fall in the
general purchasing power of money.
There are other instances, apart from claims measured by the
value of property, where protection against a fall in the value of
domestic money has been extended by the courts. Thus, one who
sought specific performance of an option-contract to sell land where
the price was fixed before the passage of the Legal Tender Acts by
Congress, making the depreciated green-backs legal tender, was required to do equity by tendering the price in coin, since that was conSee supra n. 4.
See Ingram v. Rankin (Wisconsin), supra n.22.
See next preceding section.
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templated by the seller when the option was given. 26 In actions for
-unliquidated damages such as claims for personal injuries, likewise,
the jury may properly fix their award in the light of the purchasing
power of money at the time of the trial,27 and hence, presumably, they
may give more (where general prices have risen) than would have
been compensatory at the time of the tort. In general, however, the
courts do not attempt to give indemnity for changes in the value of
domestic money. In the enforcement of contracts to pay specific
sums of money, indeed, the policy of the legal tender laws requires
them to treat a dollar in 1932 when the debt is due, as satisfaction of
a promise to pay a dollar at an earlier day, whether it was then
worth more or less. 28 The same attitude is taken, moreover, as to

changes in the value of money after the breach of the promise to pay,
and after the judgment is rendered.
Other considerations, however, come into play when the courts
are dealing with duties to pay debts or damages in foreign money. 2 0
When such a duty is sought to be enforced in our courts, they must
give their judgment for the recovery not of francs, marks, pounds,
but of dollars. Consequently, the foreign money must be expressed
in terms of its worth in dollars. As of what date, shall the foreign
money be translated into dollars? Before the World War, the currencies of most countries with which we did business were relatively
stable, and little difficulty arose, as the values at the time of the breach
of contract or tort were the same as at the time of delivering judgment, but during or shortly after the war, the currencies of most
of the European belligerents dropped violently in value, in some
cases almost to the vanishing point. A dollar which in 1913 would
buy about 4 German marks, 5 French francs, and 5 Italian lire, in 1923
would purchase about 20 francs, or 22 lire, and on November 15,
1923, the dollar would buy the astronomical number of two and one'Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wallace 557, 19 L. ed. 501 (1870).
' Halloran v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 Vt. 273, 115 Atl. 143, 18
-A. L. R. 554 (1921). Compare Palmer v. Security Trust Co., 242 Mich. 163,
218 N. W. 677, 60 A. L. R. 1392 (1928).
' See 31 U. S. Code Ann. §457: "The gold coins of the United States shall be
a legal tender in all payments at their nominal value. . . ."; see also, id. §§451461 as to other legal tender coins and currency; also Oliphant, Money in. ConinercialInstruments, 29 Yale L. J. 606 (1920) ; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wallace
457, 20 L. ed. 287 (1871).
Among the numerous discussions of this subject in legal periodicals, these
are of outstanding value: Rifkind, Money as a Dezice for Measuring Value,
.26 Col. L. Rev. 559 (1926) ; Drake, The ProperRule in Fluctuating Exchanges,
28 Mich. L. Rev. 229 (1930). Notes upon various phases of the subject appear
in 11 A. L. R. 363; 33 A. L. R. 1285, 43 A. L. R. 520.
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half billion marks! The current disturbance in monetary values
caused by the Austrian and German financial disorganization and by
the English abandonment of the gold standard, may revive these difficulties.
Most of these controversies arise in connection with contract
actions. An English lady, at the outbreak of the war, leaves a French
hotel without paying her bill. After the collapse of the franc she is
sued by the hotel-keeper in England. 30 An American deposits money
in a German bank, where he is credited with marks, and later demands payment and it is refused. 81 Then the mark collapses and he
sues the bank in an American court, attaching funds belonging to the
bank in this country. An American bank receives funds from a customer to establish a credit for him in Roumanian money in a Roumanian bank.3 2 Less frequently, similar problems arise in tort cases,
mostly claims for damages to ships in foreign ports.83
The solution of these cases imposes upon the courts an extremely
difficult balancing of opposing considerations of policy and justice.
Who shall bear the risk of a fall in the value of the foreign currency?
If the claim were asserted in the courts of the foreign country whose
money is involved, there is little doubt that those courts-as we have
seen that our courts do in dealing with claims for dollars-would
disregard the fall in the exchange value of the local currency and
thus place the loss upon the claimant. Nevertheless, this makes the
actual benefit realized from the claim depend upon the accidental
circumstances which hasten or delay the trial, and upon the time
consumed in new trials or appeals.3 4 It is true, the claimant must
bear in the other country, these risks of loss in the value of money
while seeking a remedy there, because of the necessities of local administration -(analogous to our Legal Tender Acts) in dealing with
their domestic currency, but our courts in adjudicating claims measured in foreign money, are under no such necessities. On the other
hand, if our courts, from. supposed considerations of fairness to the
claimant, relieve him of the risk of the depreciation of the foreign
des H6tels
"Socit6
n. K.
38.B. 459, 461.
infra, 3
v. Cummings,
Humphrey, [19211
Bank v.
"
Die Deutsche

Richard v. American Union Bank, infra, n. 46.
See the cases, infra, notes 48, 49.
"To take the date of judgment for determining the value is to adopt for
the measurement of a loss a test resting upon the fluctuating chances of a court
calendar instead of upon an event already fixed; that is, to put aside certainty
for uncertainty." Sutherland, J., dissenting in Die Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey, infra n. 38.
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currency, and award him his debt or damages on the basis of the
dollar's worth of his claim at the time it first arose, it relieves him,
if he lives in the foreign land, of a risk which he, in common with all
his countrymen, would bear at home in his ordinary business dealings.
This advantage, likewise, depends upon another accidental circumstance, unrelated to the merits; to-wit, that he has been able to secure jurisdiction upon his adversary, personally or by attaching his
property, in this country.
In contract cases three main lines of opinion may be identified.
First is what we may call the New York rule 8 5-the breach-day rule.
Under this view, the claimant is protected against the risk of a fall
in the value of the foreign currency, and, correspondingly would gain
no advantage from its rise. His claim, whether it be a deposit or
other debt or for the value of a commodity sold, is first assessed in
foreign currency as of the date of the breach; that is, when the obligation became due, and judgment is given for the value of that
sum in dollars according to the rate of exchange which obtained on
this same breach or due-date. In case of a deposit the due-date is the
date when payment was first properly demanded. An account matures
when it is first stated and presented. This 'breach-date rule seems
to command the assent of the English courts,3 6 and probably is supported by the greater number of American decisions.31
A second view, which we may call the Federal rule, or the "locallaw" rule, rests upon the recent and leading case of Die Deutsche
Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey.8 8 In previous cases, the Supreme Court of the United States had applied the breach-day rule
Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N. Y. 37, 138 N. E. 497 (1923) (deposit
by American in Paris bank, to be repaid in sterling in London branch: judgment for value of sterling in dollars on day of refusal of demand for payment)
Sokoloff v. National City Bank of New York, 250 N. Y. 69, 81, 164 N. E. 745
750. "The contract was broken, as of September 1, 1918, when the Petrograd
branch ceased to function. On that date, he was entitled to 120,000 rubles in
Petrograd. He wanted them and did not get them. His damages are to be
measured according to the value of rubles as of that date in Petrograd, measured in dollars in New York City, where he has sought his remedy"; Parker
v. Hoppe, 257 N. Y, 333, 178 N. E. 550 (1931) (contract in Moscow in August
1917 for purchase of wax; buyer paid 100,000 rubles, but the wax was never
shipped, but was sold to other parties in 1918; held buyer may recover value
of 100,000 rubles in dollars, not as of date of his payment, but as of date of
seller's breach of buyer's notice of rescission).
' Di Fernandino v. Simon Smits & Co., [1920] 2 K. B. 704; s. c. [1920] 3;
K. B. 409 (Ct. App.), 11 A. L. R. 358, and see discussion of English cases in
opinions in S. S. Celia v. S. S. Volturno, infra n. 49.
' Simonoff v. Granite City Bank, 279 Ill. 248, 254, 116 N. E. 636 (1917) .
Rasst v. Morris, 135 Md. 243, 108 Atl. 787 (1919).
3272 U. S. 517, 47 S. Ct. 166, 71 L. ed. 383 (1926).
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when the obligation was to pay foreign currency in this country.89
In the Deutsche Bank case, however, an American citizen had deposited money in a German bank in Germany, and demanded its payment there. It was refused, and thereafter the mark collapsed. The
obligation, consequently, clearly accrued in Germany. Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for a five-to-four majority, while approving the application of the breach-day rule to obligations to pay foreign currency payable in this country, announced that it was necessary to
apply a different rule where the money was originally due in the foreign country itself. "In this case," he said, "at the date of the demand the German bank owed no duty to the plaintiff under our law.
It was not subject to our jurisdiction and the only liability that it
incurred by its failure to pay was that which the German law might
impose. It -has incurred no additional or other one since. A suit
in this country is based upon an obligation existing under the foreign
law at the time when the suit is brought, and the obligation is not
enlarged by the fact that the creditor happens to be able to catch his
debtor here.... Here we are lending our Courts to enforce an obligation (as we should put it, to pay damages,) arising from German law
alone, and ought to enforce no greater obligation than exists by that
40
law at the moment when suit is brought."
Mr. Justice Holmes's view that the right sued on was created by
the foreign sovereign and therefore as a logically compelled deduction, the right at the time of suit in this country must be no greater
in value than if asserted in the foreign court, should be compared
with this language of Judge Learned Hand, in which he discusses the
torts cases as a prelude to a decision in a contract case: "When a
court takes cognizance of a tort committed elsewhere, it is indeed
sometimes said that it enforces the obligation arising under the
law where the tort arises. And, if this were true, it would seem to
follow that the obligation should be discharged in the money of the
sovereign in whose territory the tort occurred, and that the proper
rule would be to adopt the rate of exchange as of the time of the
judgment. However, no court can enforce any law but that of its
own sovereign, and, when a suitor comes to a jurisdiction foreign
to the place of the tort, he can only invoke an obligation recognized
'Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U. S. 71, 46 S. Ct. 46, 70 L. ed. 168 (1925) ; see
also Sutherland v. Mayer, 271 U. S. 272, 46 S. Ct. 538, 70 L. ed. 943 (1926)
which Holmes, J., in the Deutsche Bank case distinguished as involving a claim
arising under American law.

" 272 U. S. 518, 519, 520.
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by that sovereign. A foreign sovereign under civilized law imposes
an obligation of its own as nearly homologous as possible to that
arising in the place where the tort occurs. But since, apart from
specific performance, such an obligation must be discharged in the
money of that sovereign, none other being available, the obligation
so created can only be measured in that medium. The form of the
obligation must therefore be to indemnify the victim for his loss in
terms of the money of the foreign sovereign, and that obligation
necessarily speaks as of the time when it arose; that is, when the
loss occurred. Hence a foreign court is as little concerned with the
changes in the value of money in the territory where the tort arose as
are the courts of that territory itself. Each court is enforcing a
different obligation, imposed by different sovereigns, necessarily de41
fined in the terms of its own money."
It is suggested that, since a "right" is not a "thing" that is
"created" but is merely a recognition or prediction that a given claim
will be given judicial protection by judgment, no great aid toward
a wise or useful result can be given by deductions based upon the
"locality" of the "right." If, however, we are to deal in such metaphors, it would seem more natural to think of the right as created
by the sovereign whose court is called on to enforce it and consequently that the extent and measure of that right is to be determined
by that sovereign so as best to promote fairness and convenience. 42
How may these ends -best be promoted? The New York rule
fixing breach-day as the time of valuation of the foreign currency is
advantageous for its clearness and simplicity. It is generally equitable, also, in cases where an American seeks recovery of money
deposited in a foreign bank when it appears that he would probably
have removed the money to this country if he had been allowed to
withdraw it. For disputes between foreigners its fairness is not so
apparent. On the whole, however, it seems preferable to the Federal rule which makes the time of valuation depend upon a factor
only remotely related to compensation or to fairness of apportionment of risk of currency-fluctuations-the factor of the place where
the duty should have been performed. If performable in this coun4' Guinness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769, 770 (1923) affirmed as Hicks v. Guinness,
see n. 39 supra.
"'The opposing views upon this fundamental problem of conflict of laws

are presented in Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,
33 YALE L. J. 457, 469 (1924), and in an editorial note, Fluctuating Rates of

Exchange and the Conflict of Laws, 40 HARv. L. REv. 619, 623, n. 26. (1927).
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try, the Federal rule clearly coincides with the New York rule and
fixes breach-day as the time of valuation. If performable abroad,
the leading Federal case, the Deutsche Bank decision, mentioned
above, declines then to adopt breach-day as the time. Most courts
which decline to follow breach-day, choose the day when the judgment or decree is rendered as the date of which exchange will be
reckoned. 43 Whether by inadvertence or deliberation, the Deutsche
Bank opinion adopts the "moment when the suit is brought."
It has been forcibly suggested in recent discussions of the problem 44-a

suggestion with which the present writer is inclined to agree

-that neither breach-date, suit-date, nor judgment-date be accepted as
a mandatory time for valuation, nor should choice of these rest solely
upon the question of whether the contract was performable in this
or a foreign country; all of these are too inflexible. Rather should
the courts, by a realistic consideration of the particular transactions
and relationships involved, seek to work out doctrines which would
be attuned to these situations and correspond at least roughly to what
the parties in these situations might reasonably expect. For example,
in cases where Americans have deposited money in European banks,
and payment has been refused, if it appears that the deposits were
intended to be used for current expenses in Europe, or were to be
withdrawn for transmittal elsewhere, the breach-day valuation should
be applied and the depositor thereby protected against a fall in the
value of the local currency. Even if the deposit was originally intended as an indefinitely continuing location of the depositor's funds,
while it might be argued that the judgment should reflect the loss
in value which the continuance of the deposit, intact, down to the
date of judgment would have entailed, 45 yet it would still seem that
the depositor, who lives in another country, has by demanding payment evidenced an intention to withdraw his funds from this risk,
and should get the benefit of the breach-day valuation. This willingness to adjust the measure of recovery, to the probable risk to which
the plaintiff's funds would have been subjected if the contract had
been carried out, seems to be manifested in an iiportant recent
New York case. In that case the defendant, a New York bank, ac"3 Marburg v. Marburg, 26 Md. 8 (1866) ; Hawes v. Woolcock, 26 Wis. 629,
636, (1870) ; Gluck, Rate of Exchange in the Law of Damages, 22 COLUMBTA
L. REv. 217, 225 (1922).
"'Especially by Mr. Rifkind and Prof. Drake, in their articles, cited n. 29,

supra.

" Perhaps this argument would be supported by the doctrine that only those
risks known to the defendant at the time of the original making of the contract,
are assumed by him. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341 (1854).
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cepted $72,500 from the plaintiff and agreed to establish a credit for
the plaintiff of 2,000,000 lei in a Roumanian bank. The defendant delayed in carrying out its agreement for more than a year, and when
it notified the plaintiff that the credit was finally established, the value
in American money of 2,000,000 lei had diminished by about $48,000.
The plaintiff sued in New York setting out these facts. The couit
held that no cause of action was shown, 46 and said: "Presumably the
plaintiffs, when they made a contract to obtain foreign money or
credit abroad, intended to use it as money in the country where it is
the recognized medium of exchange. Fluctuations in the value of
the money, when measured by currency of this or any other country,
may not affect the use for which plaintiffs are presumed to have
intended it." The plaintiff then amended his complaint by adding the
allegation that as was known to the defendant bank, he was in the business of buying and selling foreign exchange in New York, for which
purpose the foreign credit was necessary, and that he did not intend
the deposit for use in Roumania. The court held 47 that the amended
complaint stated a cause of action, and said: "If the contract had
been performed according to its terms and the foreign moneys or
credit delivered at the stipulated time, the buyer would have assumed
the chance of profit and the risk of loss from fluctuations in the market price thereafter. By delay in delivery the seller has retained the
profit created by intervening fluctuations and has imposed a loss upon
the buyer. For the loss so imposed the buyer is entitled to damages."
Similar problems arise, but much more rarely, in tort cases.
Where the action is for a tort committed abroad, if the damages are
wholly unliquidated, as for pain and suffering, or have not been
fixed in terms of the foreign currency, no problem of translation
arises,--the court merely fixes them in the first instance in its own
money. Occasionally, however, especially in ship-collision cases,
the injured party incurs expenditures in foreign money for repairs or
the like, 48 or is deprived of payments in the foreign money for hire
of his vessel 49 , and in such cases the time for valuing the foreign
money is the time when the obligation to repay it was first incurred,
-a rule closely analogous to the breach-day rule in contract cases.
Richard v. American Union Bank, 241 N. Y. 163, 149 N. E. 338, 43 A. L.

R. 512 (1925).

Richard v. American Union Bank, 253 N. Y. 166, 170 N. E. 532, 535, 536

(1930) ; comment, 43 HARv. L. Ray. 1307 (1930).
The Verdi, 268 Fed. 903 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).

" S. S. Celia v. S. S. Volturno [1921] 2 A. C. 544 (House of Lords); 20
A. L. R. 884.

